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Quigley: Protection of Existing Workers and the Implementation of "Workfar

PROTECTION OF EXISTING WORKERS
AND THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF "WORKFARE"
I.

INTRODUCTION

Welfare reform is a hot political topic.1 This is evidenced by
reforms made at both the federal and state level.2 In fact, President
Clinton campaigned on the promise to "end welfare as we know
it."'3 A large part of the welfare reform movement includes trying to
put welfare recipients to work. This is workfare.4 The idea behind
workfare is that no one should get a free ride.5 Advocates of
workfare programs say the work experience will teach those on welfare job skills which they can use to move into the real job market.6
This concept has been in existence for years.7 While many issues
arise from the implementation of these programs, this note will
address two, where the welfare recipients will work and what effect
it will have on the low-wage workforce.
Critics of workfare requirements fear a "large number of subsidized welfare recipients flooding into the low wage labor market
and the enormous potential for the displacement of existing workers."'8 The problem arises when paid workers are being laid off and
jobs are being eliminated because of budget constraints. At the
1. See Joel F. Handler, "Ending Welfare as We Know It"--Wrong for Welfare, Wrong
for Poverty, 2 GEo. J. FiGHTIG PovmRTY 3 (1994).
2. See id.
3. Jason Deparle, The Clinton Welfare Bilk A Long Stormy Journey, N.Y. Tnrms, July

15, 1994, at Al.
4. See Tom Campbell, Welfare Speaks on Its Own Terms, RicaMoiND TmfsDISPATCH, Jan. 4, 1996, at A10.

5. See Beth J. Harpaz, Workfare Programs Gain Favor with Cities-But Critics See
Forced Work as 'Slave Labor', SEATrrL Tums, Dec. 25, 1995, at Cl. New York City's Parks
Commissioner, Henry Stem was quoted as saying, "[i]f anything, people are exploiting the
system by receiving funds without working." Id.
6. See Mary Janigan, Wading into the Welfare Mess: As Social Assistance Costs Moun4
the Provinces Move to Put Welfare Recipients to Work, MACrEAN's,Dec. 4, 1995, at 34.
7. See Handler, supra note 1, at 3.
8. Gerald M. Shea, Prepared Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Fmance, Fed.
News Serv., Fed. Information Sys. Corp., Mar. 20, 1995, at 2.
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same time, welfare workers may be used to replace those who were
laid off so that taxpayers do not feel a loss in services that a reduction in government employees could cause. In effect, the welfare
workers perform duties that full-time workers had performed previously, a concept called displacement. The New York welfare-towork statute includes provisions that prevent the displacement of
workers. 9
New York State passed legislation for putting home relief recipients to work in 1942.10 New York City is currently implementing
one of the most ambitious work experience programs in the
nation. This note analyzes New York State law and its "Work
Experience Program" ("WEP"). It explores the state of the current
law and its ability to protect workers from displacement.
II. HISTORY

New York Social Services Law section 164 provides for work
relief.' It was first enacted in 1942.'3 It was established to provide
support allowances for those in need and unable to find employment. 14 This is a New York State program for needy adults without
children. 15 It is different than the federally funded Aid to Families
with Dependent Children ("AFDC"), which provides support to
families with children. 16 Those receiving home relief are required to
perform work assigned to them by the Social Services
7

Administration.1

9. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 164(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1997). 'The Act provides that
no home relief recipients be used to "replace, or to perform any work ordinarily and actually
performed by, regular employees .
k...
Id.
10. See 1942 N.Y. LAws ch. 926. Section 164 was added to cover home relief. See id.
11. See Douglas Martin, N.Y. Cleans up with Workfare Welfare Recipients Keeping City
Tidy, PATRIOT LEDGER, Sept. 1, 1995, at 2.
12. See N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAw. § 164. Section 164 states, in pertinent part that "[a]s
hereinafter provided, employable persons receiving home relief shall be required to perform
such work as shall be assigned to them by the social services official furnishing such home
relief or by the state industrial commissioner as hereinafter provided." Id.
13. See 1942 N.Y. Laws ch. 926, § 164.
14. See iL
15. See Beth J. Harpaz, Workfare Programs Gain Favor with Cities-But Critics See
Forced Work as Slave Labor, SEkrrr TinEs, Dec. 25, 1995, at C1.
16. See David Voreacos, Bill Pits Local Welfare Workers Against State, County, Tim
REcoRD, Aug. 4, 1995, at A3.
17. See N.Y. Soa SERV. LAW § 164(1) (McKinney Supp. 1997).
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The 1942 law was enacted following a report released by the
Board of Social Welfare which documented the effect defense activity had on the home relief roles. 8I The increase in defense jobs created a marked decrease in the number of home relief recipients. 19
Not only did participation in the State's Work Project Administration drop by 41%, the number of people receiving home relief
dropped 25.1%.20 The report went on to discuss some of the reasons for the remaining home relief recipients in such a demanding
job market.21 The report found that many of the remaining home
relief recipients were considered "unemployable."' Some recipients were receiving assistance as supplements because their earnings did not cover family needs.23 It was found that employment
discrimination based on race and national origin prevented people
from obtaining jobs.24 The report dispelled the myth that there
were enormous numbers of welfare recipients cheating the system,
finding that while there were some, they
"account[ed] for a very
25
minor percentage of the total number.
The report traced the need for welfare to two factors.26 The first
factor was the change from an agricultural society to an industrial
one, where wages were earned as opposed to home manufactured
products.2 7 The second factor was a change in social consciousness,
which for the first time, looked at the poor as possessing all the
attributes of humanity and not as sub-humans.2" It is interesting to
note that the same dialogues are still going on today.2 9
18. See STATE OF NEW YORK, BOARD OF SoCIAL WELFARE, ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE
YEAR 1941, 117-28, 165th. Legis. Sess. 18 (1942) [hereinafter ANNUAL WELFARE REPORT].
The report noted that in districts where defense activity was great, the reduction in home
welfare recipients was greatest. In cities where the manufacture of consumer goods was
largest, the reduction of home welfare recipients was still a major concern. See i.
19. See id.
20. See i.
21. See id. at 19.
22. See i. at 20. The "unemployable" included women who could not leave their
families to work, persons with physical handicaps and youth or elderly age restrictions. See id.
23. See i. at 20.
24. See i. at 21.
25. Id. at 22.
26. See i. at 23.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See Joel F. Handler, "Ending Welfare as We Know It"--Wrong for Welfar4 Wrong
for Poverty, 2 GEO. J. FIGHTING Pov.T 3 (1994) (analyzing the public's perception of
welfare and the realities); Mary Janigan, Wading into the Welfare Mess: As Social Assistance
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The State acknowledged its obligation to the poor and took that
responsibility while insuring "protection to the state, to the local
welfare officer, to the taxpayer, and to the relief recipient."30 The
1942 law contained protections for "regular" public employees.31
Section 164(6)(d) disallowed public works projects that used work
relief employees to "replace regular employees of any public
department or agency of a county, city or town." 32
The law was amended in 1950.33 Section 164(2)(a) provided that
when authorized by the legislative body responsible for home relief,
the heads of public departments or units may make requests to the
public welfare office for workers to be assigned to their units.34 Section 164(2)(b), provided that the public welfare official assigning
the persons should determine that the recipient not be used to
"replace, or to perform any work ordinarily performed by, regular
employees of any department or other unit of such county, city or
town. '35 The language for protecting existing public employees was
further strengthened by not only preventing home relief recipients
from replacing existing workers, but also from 3performing
any
6
duties ordinarily performed by regular employees.
In 1956, the law was again amended to strengthen the protection
of existing workers.37 This is evidenced by the legislative declaration in section 1 that states "it is not the intent or purpose of the
legislature, by such enactment, to authorize or permit the utilization
of such persons to replace, or perform any work ordinarily done by,
regular employees of any public agency, or workers in any trade or
Costs Moun the Provinces Move to Put Welfare Recipients to Work, MAcLEAN's, Dec. 4,
1995, at 34 (discussing the arguments for and against Canada's developing workfare system).
30. ANNUAL WELFARE REPORT, supra note 18, at 24.

31. See 1942 N.Y. Laws ch. 926, § 164.
32. Id. § 164(6)(d).
33. See 1950 N.Y. Laws ch. 435, § 164.
34. See id. § 164(2)(a). The relevant text of this provision is as follows:
When the legislative body of acounty, city or town which is responsible for
providing home relief shall determine and direct that employable persons in receipt
of home relief shall be assigned to perform work for such county, city or town, the
head of any department, bureau, division or other unit thereof may request that
such persons be assigned to his unit. The request shall be addressed to the public
welfare official and shall indicate the number of persons who can be used and the

character of the work to be performed.
Id

35. 1950 N.Y. Laws ch. 435, § 164(2)(b).
36. See id
37. See 1956 N.Y. Laws ch. 695, § 164.
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craft in private employment., 38 Social Services Law section
164(2)(b) was amended to include protection of work "performed
by, craft or trade in private employment."3 9 It is clear that protecting existing jobs and workers wag a concern of the legislature.
The 1956 amendment was temporary. In 1959, the temporary
provisions of the 1956 amendment were removed and enacted with
the employee protections in place.40 In 1962, section 164(2)(a) was
amended to allow relief workers to be assigned to state agencies.41
In 1971, the law changed section 1 from "employable persons
receiving home relief may be required to perform.., work" to
"employable persons receiving home relief shall be required to perform .. .work." 42 In addition to changing "public welfare" to
"social services," it required the social service officials to "provide
for the establishment of public work projects" as opposed to only
"determin[ing] and direct[ing] employable persons ... to perform
work. '43 The trend indicated by the 1962 and 1971 amendments not
only makes it mandatory for home relief recipients to be assigned
44
to work, but increases the places where they could be placed.
New York City suspended their public works program from 1973
to 1976 and replaced it with a work relief program.45 The difference
was that instead of receiving a social services relief check for the
work, the recipient received a paycheck from the department for
which he/she was working, in order to make the situation as similiar
to a work-like atmosphere as possible. 46 There was a direct correlation between the check amount and the amount of time the recipient worked.47 The Human Resources Administration then
transferred funds to the employers to cover these payments from a
38. Id.§ 164(1).
39. Id. § 164(2)(b).
40. See 1959 N.Y. Laws ch. 714, § 164.
41. See 1962 N.Y. Laws ch. 673, § 164(2)(a).
42. Compare 1962 N.Y. Laws ch. 673, § 164(1), with 1971 N.Y. Laws ch. 101, § 164(1).
43. Compare 1962 N.Y. Laws ch. 673, § 164(1), with 1971 N.Y. Laws ch. 101, § 164(1).
44. See 1962 N.Y. Laws ch. 673, § 164. The legislature then extended placements to the
state. See id.In 1971, the legislature mandated the establishments of placements by the social
services official and strengthened the language of the work requirement. See 1971 N.Y. Laws
ch. 101, § 164(2)(a).
45. See District Council 37 v. City of New York, O.C.B. Dec. No. 21-81, No. RU-760-80

(June 30, 1981) (on file with author). The court reviews the history of section 164 of the N.Y.
Social Services Law. See id.
46. See id at 8.
47. See id.
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relief fund. 4 8 The payments did not come from the employers'
budgets. 4 9 The participants also received fringe benefits such as
Workmen's Compensation, sick leave and annual leave, but were
also required to pay income taxes.50 The participants were also permitted to join unions.5 In May 1976, the enabling legislation for the
the original
Work Relief Employment Program expired 52 . In 1976,
53
City.
the
by
reinstituted
was
Program
Public Works
The current work relief statutes contain protections for regular
employees.5 4 Section 164(2)(b) states that home relief recipients
shall not replace or perform work of private craft or trade employees, displace regular employees in agencies or institutions where
they are assigned or perform work ordinarily performed by regular
employees.5 5 This language makes clear that some protection was
meant to be given to the existing workforce. However, the courts
interpretation of this section offers little if any protection in
reality

56

48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 9.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 164(2)(b) (McKinney Supp. 1997). Section 164(2)(b)
currently reads:
The social services official or the state industrial commissioner shall thereupon
assign such persons in receipt of home relief who, in his judgment, are able to
perform the work indicated, provided he is satisfied that such persons will not be
used to replace, or to perform any work ordinarily and actually performed by,
regular employees of any department or other unit of such county, city or town, or
to replace, or to perform any work which would ordinarily be performed by, craft or
trade in private employment. In assigning persons to public work projects operated
by a nonprofit agency orinstitution, the social services official or the state industrial
commissioner shall be satisfied that such assignment will not result in the
displacement of regular employees of the agency or institution or in the
performance of work that is being performed which would ordinarily be performed
by such regular employees.
Id.
55. See iU
56. See Ballentine v. Sugarman, 344 N.Y.S.2d 39 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
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IH. JUDICIAL

Workfare

INTERPRETATION OF SoCIAL SERVICES LAW

SECrON 164(2)(b)
It must be noted that under the current law,57 the social services
official or state industrial commissioner is given the authority to
determine whether employees are being replaced by the home
relief recipients.58 Therefore, the first objection to the placement of
workfare participants must be made to these officials.59 If a petitioner is dissatisfied with the commissioner's determination, he or
she can bring an Article 78 action in court. 60 The petitioner contesting the placement of workfare participants must show that the
Social Services Administration acted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner when determining that there was no replacement of
existing workers. This is a difficult standard to prove.
Ballentine v. Sugannan61 was an Article 78 proceeding wherein
the petitioners were seeking to enjoin the Department of Social
Services from placing home relief recipients in Civil Service jobs at
a lower wage than regular Civil Service employees. 62 The court
combined two cases, one where the petitioners were Civil Service
employees and their union63 and one where the petitioners were
home relief recipients.64 The Gotbaum petitioners alleged that the
home relief participants were being assigned the jobs of regular
employees at a lower wage and in non-compliance with the Civil
Service requirements of competition which are provided for in the
State Constitution Article 5, section 6.65 The Ballentine petitioners
alleged that they were entitled to all the rights of the regular Civil
57. See N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law § 164 (McKinney Supp. 1997).
58. See id. § 164(2)(b).
59. See id.
60. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801 (McKinney 1994). This provision provides for judicial
review of final state agency decisions. See id. It has been established that the standard for
judicial review is arbitrary and capricious. See Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
61. 344 N.Y.S.2d 39 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
62. See id. at 42.
63. See id. at 41.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 42-43. The N.Y. Constitution states that: "Appointments and promotions
in the civil service of the state and all of the civil divisions thereof, including cities and
villages, shall be made according to merit and fitness to be ascertained, as far as practicable,
by examination which, as far as practicable, shall be competitive .... N.Y. CoNsT. art. V, § 6
(McKinney 1995).
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Service employees, including sick time and regular wages. 66 Otherwise, they said the situation violated the Thirteenth Amendment 67
68
and constituted peonage.
The court held that the placement of the home relief recipients
did not "[c]onstitute appointments and promotions in the civil service" 69 as required by the New York Constitution and therefore did
not violate the State Constitution provisions for Civil Service. 70 The
court held that just because the work the home relief recipient does
is similar to a regular Civil Service employee, it is not in fact a Civil
Service job because he is receiving his benefit check as compensation and not a regular wage.71 The court also allowed relief recipients to supplement the work of regular employees by doing the
same kind of work.72 The court held that relief recipients could supplement manpower shortages due to budgetary restrictions. 73 They
justified this by a 1971 amendment to section 16474 that changed the
phrase "ordinarily performed by regular employees" to "ordinarily
and actually performed by regular employees." 75 The court interpreted this to mean that Social Services can only violate section
164(2)(b) of the statute by actually eliminating a regular employee
with the intention to replace them with a home relief recipient. 76
This is an extremely narrow interpretation.
The court also dismissed the complaint by the home relief recipients themselves as without merit.77 Much of the Court's analysis in
Ballentine was based on Social Investigator Eligibles Ass'n v. Tayor.78 In Taylor, the plaintiffs sought an order of mandamus against
the Comptroller of the City of New York and Commissioner of
Public Welfare to discontinue placing people as social investigators
66. See Ballentine v. Sugarman, 344 N.Y.S.2d 39, 41 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
68. For a discussion of workfare, the Thirteenth Amendment and peonage, see Cynthia
A. Bailey, Workfare and Involuntary Servitude-What You Wanted to Know But Were Afraid
to Ask, 15 B.C. Timn WORLD LJ.285 (1995).
69. Ballentine, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 43.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

See id.
See iL
See id.at 44.
See iet
See 1971 N.Y. Laws ch. 101, § 164.
Ballentine v. Sugarman, 344 N.Y.S.2d 39, 44 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1973).
See id.
See id.
at 45.
197 N.E. 262 (N.Y. 1935).
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who were not appointed pursuant to the Civil Service Law and
rules.7 9 The petitioner was an organization comprised of 250 eligible persons for appointment to the position of "Social Investigator."8 0 They contested the appointment of persons to these
positions under the Emergency Relief Act.8 ' The Act excused the
applicants from the civil service examination. 82 The petitioners
challenged the constitutionality of this under Article V section 6 of
the New York Constitution.'
The court held that placing persons in civil service jobs who
where exempt from the necessary requirements of Civil Service did
not violate the New York Constitution. 84 It held that the State had
an interest in helping the unemployed.8 5 This is evident in the New
York Constitution, Article 8 section 10, which gives the state some
responsibility in fighting unemployment."6 Based on the rule that
"[t]he fundamental law is to be read as a whole,.., as to give effect
to every other provision,"' the court held that the Emergency
Relief Act served the purpose of fighting unemployment and it did
not violate the purpose of the Civil Service Law, which is meant to
fight a "spoils system of office holding." 88 The petitioners were
never employed by the City and the compensation for the work
recipients was coming from the Emergency Relief Fund and not the
civil service appropriations8 9 Thus, the petitioners were contesting
their nonplacement in civil service jobs that did not actually exist. 90
The court agreed that there must be some limit to the appointment
of workers, but did not see that limit in the present facts. 91
In Danker v. Department of Health of City of New York, 92 the
Appellate Court granted a writ of alternative mandamus against the
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

See id.
See id. at 262-63.
See id.
See id. at 263.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See N.Y. Const. art. 8, § 10.
Social Investigator Eligibles Ass'n v. Taylor, 197 N.E. 262, 264 (1935).
Id.
See id.
See id
See id.
194 N.E. 857 (N.Y. 1935).
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Department of Health. 93 Cecilia Danker was an employed civil service nurses' assistant for twelve years. 94 Her position was abolished
by the City and she was discharged. 95 Afterwards, three emergency
relief workers were allegedly performing her duties.96 The court
held that if Ms. Danker could prove these allegations and show that
there were appropriations for her position, then she would be entitled to relief.97 Ms. Danker "could not be reinstated without showing that the position exists and that there is an appropriation to
cover it."9 Thus, if the State legitimately cuts the budget for a public department and then uses relief workers to help the department
perform its functions, it is not violating the law. This case coincides
with the Ballentine decision99 in requiring that the government must
intentionally dismiss workers for the reason of replacing them with
relief workers.
In a 1983 case, AFSCME New York Council, 66, v. County of
Niagara'00 the Court dismissed an Article 78 proceeding alleging
violation of Social Services Law section 164(2)(b). 101 It held that
Marguerite A. Blakely, a lab assistant who was dismissed, was not a
temporary employee and as such was not entitled to the protection
under section 164 of the Social Services Law.' °z The court also held
that "[t]he mere fact that public assistance recipients may perform
work that is similar to the work done by the bargaining unit
employees herein, or by any other civil service employees, is insufficient to invoke the prohibitions of Section 164. '1 ° 3 Citing Ballentine, the court held that in order to violate section 164 "there must
be a showing that some such employee has1 been
dismissed to make
4
room for the public assistance recipient."'
In AFSCME, New York District,66 v. City of Lackawanna,105 the
court dismissed the Article 78 petition brought by the union to chal93. See iL
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See id. at 858.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 858-59.
Id. at 859.
See discussion supra notes 60-76 and accompanying text.
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 10, 1983) (on file with author).
See id. at 4.
See id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 20, 1986) (on file with author).
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lenge the City's action in laying off union workers and then replacig them with workfare participants. °6 The court held that
budgetary restrictions were the cause of the layoffs and there was
no intention to lay off regular employees in order to replace
them. 10 7 "There has been no showing that the city intentionally
took steps to displace the union employees with 'Workfare' people.
The contrary is true. The record is clear that budgetary considerations were foremost in causing those decisions to be reached." 08
The court held that the petitioners did not show that the City of
Lackawanna laid off employees to "make room for Workfare
employees" as required by Ballentine.0 9
An example of the difficulty in proving displacement is the fact
that one of the employees in the Lackawanna case who was laid off,
was subsequently unable to get a job. 110 He went on welfare and
was assigned to perform the tasks he had performed as a city
worker for three years before he was laid off.1 '
It is clear by this decision that intent to replace employees with
"workfare" recipients is required to show a violation of Social Services Law section 164(2)(b).
New York judgments offer little protection to regular employees.
If the City eliminates jobs because of budgetary constraints, it has
the option to have the job performed by a welfare recipient for a
fraction of the cost. If this policy is upheld, in a time of government
budget deficits, a city or state would almost always be justified in
eliminating jobs and having them performed by welfare recipients.
IV.

STUDY OF T=E CuRRENT SIrUATION IN

Npw

YORK

Seventeen thousand union jobs were eliminated in New York
City since Mayor Giuliani took office." 2 The entire elimination was
done through severance packages." 3 In New York City the Work
106. See id. at 2.
107. See id. at 4.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 5.
110. See Nanine Meiklejohn, Prepared Statement on Proposals to Reform Welfare
Before the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Human Resources, in Fed. News Serv.
Wash. Package (Feb 2, 1995) at 5.
111. See id.
112. See Christina Pretto, N.Y.C. Mayor Issues Analysis of City's Management
Performance in Fiscal '95, BoND BuYER,Sept. 15, 1995, at 5.
113. See id.
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Experience Program continues to grow." 4 As a result of the program, Mayor Giuliani has put about 20,000 welfare recipients to
work."' The goal for fiscal year 1996 is to place 10,000 additional
workfare participants to work while continuing to cut the
of New
workforce.1 16 This ambitious workfare program is the result
11 7 NYC
York City Work, Accountability, You ("NYC WAY").
WAY is the welfare reform initiative started by Income Support
("IS"), the Office of Employment Services ("OES") and the Office
of Revenue Investigations ("ORI").118 It uses eligibility verification
strategies, job search activities and job assignments in an effort to
reduce the welfare roles.1 19 All able-bodied home relief recipients
are required to work. 1 0 According to the Mayor's Management
Report, the work requirements and rigorous screening process has
resulted in a decline in home relief cases by 32,828 for Fiscal Year
1995.121

The Work Experience Program participants are placed in many
of the City's agencies." 2 Four hundred and sixty six WEP participants were placed in the Department of Transportation for Fiscal
Year 1995.121 The projected number of placements for the 1996 Fiscal Year is 550."2 The participants perform clerical duties, telephone answering and office maintenance. 12
The Department of Sanitation began using WEP participants in
July 1995.126 The workers are used to clean City streets and clean
114. See Crr OF NEw YoRK, Txi MAYOR'S MANAGEMENT REPORT, FISCAL 1995 VoL. I
161 (Sept. 14, 1995). The goal for fiscal year 1996 is to increase the Work Experience
Program assignments from 19,498 to 30,000. See id.
115. See id.
116. See idU
117. See id.
118. See id.at 166.
119. See id.
120. See i&. at 167.
121. See id. The report does not show whether the reduction is the result of catching
fraudulent claims and putting people to work or from restrictions that eliminate part of the
needy population.
122. WEP workers have been placed in the Department of Transportation, Sanitation
and Parks and Recreation, to name a few. See id. at 42, 92, 99.
123. See id. at 49.
124. See id.
125. See Telephone Interview with Anna Budd, Director of Work Experience Program at
the New York City Department of Transportation (Feb. 5, 1996).
126. See Crry OF NEw YoRi, TnE MAYoR's MANaEmiENT REPORT, FISCAL 1995 Vol- I
92 (Sept. 14, 1995).
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the perimeters of vacant lots. 127 "The City's streets were rated 74.6
percent acceptably clean in fiscal year 1995."' This was a three
percent increase from fiscal year 1994.129 The Department of Sanitation "cleaned 16,440 vacant lots during Fiscal 1995, compared
with 15,061 during Fiscal 1994. "13O These numbers provided by the
Mayor's office explicitly show that the Sanitation Department has
been more productive in 1995, after the reduction of the sanitation
workforce. According to Peter Scarlatos, President of The Uniformed Sanitationmens Association, the union that represents sanitation workers in New York City, since the Mayor has been in
office, the number of his union's employees has been reduced from
10,000 to 6,500.131 All of these jobs were eliminated by attrition. 132
According to the Department of Sanitation, "[a]pproximately 1,800
WEP workers are cleaning Sanitation facilities, areas around vacant
lots, and streets, as well as performing clerical tasks and delivering
departmental mail."'1 33 Both the City and the Union deny that the
WEP participants are performing any jobs that are normally done
by union members. 134 Sanitation's Assistant Commissioner for
Operations Planning, Evaluation and Control pointed at the advantages to the Sanitation union members. "[T]he refuse the WEP
workers collect ultimately must be carted away by full-time employees and a number of sanitation workers [union members] have been
promoted to supervisory positions to help administer the WEP
workers." 35 When Peter Scarlatos was pressed further about the
127. See iL at 93.
128. Id. at 92.
129. See id.
130. Id. at 93.
131. See Telephone interview with Peter Scarlatos, President, Uniformed Sanitationmens
Association (Dec. 27, 1995) [hereinafter Scarlatos Interview].
132. See id.
133. Peter Benjaminson, Charge "Workfare" Stealing Jobs, CraMF LEADER, Sept. 29,
1995, at 1.
134. See id. Steven W. Lawitts, Sanitation's Assistant Commissioner for Operations
Planning, Evaluation and Control said that the WEP workers are performing jobs that have
not been done in the past. See id. They are doing work the full-time sanitation workers have
not performed in five years., See id. Peter Scarlatos said, the [WEP] workers are "sweeping
sidewalks," things union members do not do. Id. He attributed the improved work
performance of the Sanitation Department to his workers working harder. See Scarlatos
Interview, supra note 131.
135. Benjaminson, supra note 133, at 1.
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effects of WEP workers on union jobs, he refused to respond
because of ongoing negotiations with the City of New York.136
The Department of Parks and Recreation employs the most
WEP workers.1 37 "The Department's WEP enrollment has" grown
steadily over the last year, from 836 in October 1994 to 4,300 in
August 1995."' 13s Like the Sanitation Department, the Parks
Department's performance has gone up despite the fact that the
full-time workforce has been reduced by one-half. 139 The cleanliness rating, which examines the amount of broken glass, graffiti and
weeds in the parks as well as the conditions of the lawns, has
increased eleven percent. 40 The New York City taxpayer is experiencing a cleaner city and better parks, for a bargain price.
South Brooklyn Legal Services and Legal Services of New York
are preparing to sue for illegally replacing existing workers with
workfare recipients. 41 The City has answered these allegations by
noting that it downsized the City's workforce before formulating
welfare plans.142 The City maintains that none of the 20,000 WEP
workers replaced any of the 17,000 workers eliminated. 43 What is
obvious is that while union jobs are being eliminated through attrition, some city services have improved. 44
The problem presented to New York City's workforce is that it is
unable to meet the standard set out in Ballentine.145 Seventeen
thousand workers have been eliminated in the past two years. 46
Many departments have seen an improvement in performance rates
while there has been a huge increase in WEP workers. Ballentine
136. See Scarlatos Interview, supra note 131.
137. See Crry OF NEW YORK, TBE MAYOR'S MANAGEMENT REPORT, FISCAL 1995 VoL- I

99 (Sept. 14, 1995).
138. Id.
139. See Douglas Martin, N.Y. Cleans Up With Workfare Recipients Keeping City 77dy,
PATRIOT LEDGER, Sept. 1, 1995, at B2.
140. See Crry OF NEw YoRK,Tim MAYOR'S MANAGEMENT REPORT, FisCAL 1995 VOL I
98 (Sept. 14, 1995). "Highlights include 50 percent, 35 percent and 31 percent drops in the
number of sites with unacceptable levels of glass, litter and weeds, respectively." Id.

141. See Douglas Martin, New York Workfare Expansion Fuels Debate,N.Y. TimEs, Sept.
1, 1995, at Al.
142. See id.
143. See Christina Pretto, NYC Mayor Issues Analysisof City's Management Performance
in Fiscal'95, BOND BUYER, Sept. 15, 1995, at 5.
144. See generally Crry OF NEw YoRK,TnE MAYOR'S MANAGEMENT REPORT, FISCAL

1995 VoL I 99 (Sept. 14, 1995).
145. See discussion supra notes 60-76 and accompanying text.
146. See Pretto, supra note 142, at 5.
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held that budgetary restraints were a legitimate reason for eliminating city jobs.14 7 When was any municipal government not under fiscal restraints? We live in a time of government deficits. These
deficits could be used to show fiscal restraints for most governments. If this is the case, when would a government not be justified
in eliminating jobs and having relief workers perform the duties
that were previously performed by full time workers? To show a
violation of Social Services Law section 164(2)(b) employees must
prove that they were eliminated specifically to be replaced by work
relief recipients.148 An intent to replace the employee with a
workfare worker is needed.1 49 This is an impossible burden to meet
when the government can show a budget deficit.
V. Tim

PROBLEM WITH REPLACING FULL WAGE WORKERS

wrrH WORKFORCE WoRKERS
The effects of an influx of welfare workers to the wages of the
workers of the low paying job market have been documented.'
The problem is that many welfare recipients are not qualified for
anything but low paying, unskilled jobs.' 51 "Welfare recipients generafly have lower levels of formal education, less on-the-job experience, and fewer job skills than the general population.'15 2 The
current workfare programs place welfare recipients in clerical and
maintenance positions. 53 The emphasis is on job placement, not
job training. 54 The Economic Policy Institute's Report, Cutting
Wages By Cutting Welfare' 55 ("Report"), analyzes the effect wide
scale federal welfare-to-work policies will have on the wages of the
working poor. 156 Using conservative estimates, the number of wel147. See Ballentine v. Sugarman, 344 N.Y.S.2d 39, 44 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973).
148. See id.
149. See AFSCME New York Council, 66 v. City of Lackawaana, at 4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb.
20, 1986) (on file with author).
150. See generallyLawrence Mischel and John Schmitt, Cutting Wages by Cutting Welfare,
BRmnuN

PAPER, Oct. 3, 1995.

151. See id. at 3-4.
152. Id. at 3.
153. See Crry OF NEW YoRK,Tim MAYOR'S MANAGEMENT REPORT, FISCAL 1995 VOL. I

(Sept. 14, 1995).
154. See generally Mark Dunlea, Workfare as a Panacea Just Doesn't Work, BuFFALo
NEws, June 12, 1995, at 2C.
155. Lawrence Mischel and John Schmitt, Cutting Wages by Cutting Welfare, BuFgmNG
PAPER, Oct. 3, 1995.

156. See id. at 3.
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fare recipients required to enter the job force will be approximately
928,000 by the year 2000.157 Because of the skill levels they possess,
many welfare recipients will be "competing with the least-paid segment of the current workforce."' 158 The low-wage workforce is
defined as those workers earning $7.19 per hour or less.1 5 9 The
Report, in assuming that no jobs were lost by the current low-wage
work force and that the required number of welfare recipients do in
fact find jobs, finds that in New York 88,549 welfare recipients will
be placed. 160 This, in turn, will cause a decrease of $1.03 per hour in
the wages of existing workers who already get paid less than $7.19
per hour.' 6' This puts the burden of welfare reform on the working
poor, the least resilient of our population.
Current trends indicate a decline in the real earnings of the less
skilled and educated workers. 62 There has been a 50% increase 1in
63
the poverty rate of full-time workers in the last thirteen years.
"In 1991, 18% of full-time workers earned less than the poverty line
for a family of four."'" The unemployment rate has doubled for
both high school graduates and dropouts from 1970 to 1989165
Adding to the problems is the shift of full-time work to contingent
work. Contingent jobs account for over 25% of the entire
workforce.166 "Manpower Inc. [whose business is to provide
employers with temporary employees] is the single largest employer
in the U.S. today."' 67 Part-time work tends to pay less than fulltime work and does not provide health care coverage or other benefits.' 68 By eliminating full-time city jobs and replacing them with
WEP recipients, who work an average of twenty two hours per
week, the city is contributing to this trend.
157. See id.
158. Id. at 3-4.
159. See idat 4.
160. See id. at 7.
161. See id.
162. See Joel F. Handler, "Ending Welfare as We Know It"--Wrong for Welfare, Wrong
for Poverty, 2 GEo. J. FIGHTNo PovaTY 3, 10 (1994).
163. See id.
164. Id.
165. See id.
at 11.
166. Gerald M. Shea, Prepared Testimony Before the Senate Committee on F'mance, in
Fed. News Serv., Fed. Information Sys. Corp. (Mar. 20, 1995) at 1.
167. Id.
168. See Joel F. Handler, "Ending Welfare as We Know It"--Wrong for Welfare, Wrong
for Poverty, 2 GEo. J. FioHIN Povmr ny 3, 12 (1994).
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Welfare-to-work advocates often cite the need for welfare recipients to learn a work ethic. 69 A study conducted in Chicago in 1988
and 1990 found that most welfare mothers work to supplement
their welfare grant.170 Of the fifty families studied, almost all of
them received additional income from either work or friends and
relatives to cover rent and utilities because the average welfare
grant is not enough. 71 "Almost half of the additional money that
the AFDC families needed to live on was earned but not
reported. 1 1 72 The results in Chicago have been replicated in Cambridge, Massachusetts, Charleston, South Carolina and San
Antonio, Texas. 73 The authors of the study concluded that "single
mothers do not turn to welfare because they are pathologically
dependent on handouts or unusually reluctant to work; they do so
because they cannot get jobs that pay better than welfare."'174 This
is further evidenced by the proportion of welfare recipients who
leave welfare for work only to return. 75 This evidence debunks the
myth that people are on welfare because they do not want to work.
The reality is than many welfare recipients cannot find jobs that will
support them. The effects of a large influx of low paid workers in
the job market caused by programs like New York City's WEP program, will further diminish the jobs that pay a living wage and will
arguably lead to more welfare recipients overall.
Another way the working poor will pay the costs of workfare
programs is through child care. "Presently, there are long waiting
lists for subsidized child care.' 1 7 6 Common sense dictates that many
of those on the waiting lists are those who cannot afford private day
care. Many in this group would qualify as the working poor. In
order to send mothers to work, child care must be provided. Are
welfare recipients going to be given the much coveted subsidized
child care spots? Will they be placed on the list and only required to
work when their name comes up? It would be unfair to give subsi169.
170.
171.
172.

See id. at 15.
See id
See id.
Id

173. See id.at 16.

174. IL
175. See id. More than two thirds of new welfare recipients leave within two years. Id.
"As high as two thirds... of welfare exits ...occur when the mother finds a job or works
continuously until she leaves welfare." Id.
176. Id at 29.
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dized daycare to workfare recipients ahead of, or instead of, lowwage workers. In addition, this could cause more low-wage workers
to lose their jobs because of their inability to find adequate child
care, which may ultimately cause them to become welfare recipients
themselves. How ironic it would be for someone to lose a job that
pays $6.00 an hour because they could not afford adequate daycare,
only to be given daycare so they could pick up garbage in return for
their welfare check.
Advocates for the poor demand that real welfare reform be a
comprehensive program which provides support and creates real
jobs.'7 7 The jobs created must have decent wages, child care and
health benefits to insure the success of welfare recipients. 178 Many
welfare recipients live in communities with very high unemployment rates.' 79 Nanine Meiklejohn of the American Federation of
State County and Municipal Employees gives numerous reasons for
the return to welfare of many recipients. These reasons include;
"low educational and skill levels; declining wages at the bottom of
the economic ladder; a shift from higher paying, more stable manufacturing jobs to lower paying, less stable service sector jobs; a lack
of job opportunities in areas of chronically high unemployment;
and, more recently, the transfer of government functions to private
contractors who pay their workers minimum wages and no benefits."' 180 The downsizing private companies can be added to this
list. 18 "During December [1994 U.S. employers] eliminated an
average of 20,000 jobs per week."'"
177. See Nanine Meiklejohn, Prepared Statement on Proposals to Reform Welfare
Before the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Human Resources (Feb. 2, 1995), in
Fed. News Serv. Wash. Package (Feb 2, 1995) at 2 [hereinafter Meiklejohn]. New York State
Department of Social Service's interim commissioner and workfare proponent noted, "long
waiting lists for child-care slots already are rampant throughout New York State for AFDC
mothers who have found real jobs. Should we take away slots from them to push other
AFDC mothers into make-work positions?" Mark Dunlea, Workfare as a Panacea Just
Doesn't Work, BUFFALo NEWS, June 12, 1995, at 2C.
178. See Meiklejohn, supra note 177, at 2.
179. See id.
at 3.
180. Id. at 3.
181. See Barbara Reynolds, Workers Get Crushed in Downsizing Rush, USA ToDAY, Jan.
26, 1996, at 13A. "Since 1991, nearly 2.5 million workers have fallen victim to corporate
restructuring, a carnage without precedent for a U.S. economy in the midst of recovery, some
economists have noted." Id.
182. Gerald M.Shea, Prepared Testimony Before the Senate Committee on Finance, Fed.
News Serv., Fed. Information Sys. Corp., Mar. 20, 1995, at 3 [hereinafter Shea].
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The less stable job situation causes workers to go in and out of
the workforce. Many welfare recipients use AFDC in lieu of unemployment insurance because they are ineligible for unemployment
insurance due to their intermittent work histories.18 3 The job outlook for New York City looks poor, with the City losing 500,000
jobs between 1987 and 1992Y s4 "The number of people looking for
jobs in New York City exceeds the number of jobs available by 7 to
1. ' ' 135 These numbers do not even take into consideration the 17,000
jobs eliminated by the city.
VI.

WELFARE REFORM

Workfare has not been proven to be successful or cost effective in
the long run." 6 "New York City's best estimates show that just 4
percent of workfare participants find real jobs."'17 The Hunger
Action Network of New York State advocates welfare reform
through "job creation, an increased minimum wage and earnedincome tax credit, expanded transitional child care and Medicaid,
and increased opportunities for welfare recipients to earn money
without being penalized."'"
The American Federation Of State, County and Municipal
Employees, AFL-CIO recommends the following for welfare
reform: expand coverage of unemployment insurance; insure a living wage to all workers; training and parenting activities should be
given respect in determining work requirements; working welfare
recipients should receive the same compensation as other workers;
unions should be included in organizing workfare programs; states
should be able to develop programs that make work more
rewarding than welfare; welfare offices should change their emphasis from providing benefits to finding work and an emphasis should
be placed on case management. 9
183.
184.
185.
186.

See Meiklejohn, supra note 177, at 3.
See id. at 4.
Id. at 4 (citing Philip Harvey, NEWSDAY, Dec. 11, 1994, at A7.).
See Mark Dunlea, Workfare as a PanaceaJust Doesn't Work, BUFFALo NEWS, June

12, 1995, at 2C.

187. Id. (citing a report by Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation in Sept.
1993).
188. Id.

189. See Meiklejohn, supra note 177, at 6-7.
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Gerald M. Shea of the AFL-CIO advocates the participation of
unions in job placement administrations. 190 He asserts that the way
to reform welfare is to create jobs that earn a living wage and not to
implement subsidized welfare jobs to the detriment of low-wage
workers. 91 He further recommends that there be subsidized child
care for low-wage earners and welfare recipients."9
Currently, in New York City, there is a movement to organize the
City's workfare participants.' 93 Stanley Hill, the executive director
of District Council 37, a local of the national union the American
Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, declared he
has planned a meeting "with a community group that has gotten
more than 4,000 city workfare laborers to sign authorization cards
pledging their support for a union.' 1 9 4 Currently, the workfare
workers are not classfied as employees under the law.' 95 This means
"the city is not required to recognize or bargain with such workers,
even if a majority backs a union .... ,,196 Workfare workers see
unionization as a way to protect their rights, help get them permanant jobs "and most important[ly] ... make them treat us with
respect."'1 97
VII.

CONCLUSION

Overall the motives behind the current workfare programs must
be analyzed. Who is the government helping and who are they hurting? There is no indication that making people work in return for
their welfare checks benefits the recipients. There is an indication,
as shown above, that an influx of workers who are compensated by
their welfare checks could diminish and weaken the low wage job
base. Included in the New York Statute are protections for the
existing job base, but as we have seen, they do little, if anything, in
reality. Assuming the phrase "end welfare as we know it"' 98 didn't
190. See Shea, supra note 182, at 3.
191. See id. at 4.
192. See id. at 4-5.
193. See Steven Greenhouse, City Labor DirectorBacks Effort to Organize Workfare
Participants,N.Y. TaMms, Feb. 9, 1997, at 39.
194. Id.
195. See id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 42.
198. Jason DeParle, The Clinton Welfare Bilkr A Long Stormy Journey, N.Y. TIMES, July
15, 1994, at Al.
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mean make it worse, the exploitation of our country's poorest constituents is no solution.
PatriciaA. Quigley
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